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ABSTRACT
This Article considers the impact of a hypothetical nonconsen-
sual pornography victim’s previous sexual history on potential legal
remedies, both criminal and civil. Due to jury bias and the difficulty
in proving standard elements of many claims, the research shows
that such a victim would likely be unsuccessful in court. This Article
then turns to two legal concepts from related fields—the incremental
harm doctrine and rape shield laws—and considers what effect their
application would have on the hypothetical victim’s case. Ultimately,
the author presents an argument for the logical expansion of rape
shield laws to cases of nonconsensual pornography.
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INTRODUCTION
Ending a romantic relationship is rarely a fun proposal, but in
some cases it can be a nightmare. In 2017, Blac Chyna1 learned first-
hand the misery that comes with a scorned lover’s revenge.2 After
dissolving her relationship with Robert Kardashian, Jr., the father
of her child, Chyna said Kardashian would not leave her alone, so
she sent him a video of herself with another man.3 Little did she
know, Kardashian would in turn post that video—along with a
series of other sexually explicit images featuring Chyna—to his
Instagram and Twitter accounts for his nearly ten million follow-
ers.4 Carrie Goldberg, a lawyer who fights sexual exploitation, de-
scribed the move as “completely unprecedented for somebody with
such an enormous social media following.”5
Kardashian’s actions provide a textbook example of noncon-
sensual pornography. Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Mary
Anne Franks define the phenomenon as “distribution of sexually
graphic images of individuals without their consent,” regardless of
whether the images were originally obtained with consent.6 A spe-
cific subgenre of nonconsensual pornography called revenge porn
occurs when a former romantic partner distributes sexually explicit
images without consent.7 After falling victim to revenge porn, Chyna
said she was “devastated.”8 “This is a person that I trusted,” she
said, adding, “I felt comfortable, you know, with even sending these
pictures.”9
1. Blac Chyna’s real name is Angela White. Valeriya Safronova, 3 Current-Day
Duels (of the Social-Media Variety), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/01/07/fashion/mens-style/feuds-soulja-boy-chris-brown-graydon-carter-donald
-trump.html [https://perma.cc/VE2S-H52C].
2. See Elahe Izadi, ‘Total Victory’: Blac Chyna Granted Restraining Order After Rob
Kardashian Posted Explicit Photos, WASH. POST (July 10, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/07/10/blac-chyna-devastated-after-rob
-kardashian-posted-explicit-photos-online-files-restraining-order/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.150f2b9a0571 [https://perma.cc/TC3P-LVJN].
3. Id.
4. Katie Mettler, What Rob Kardashian Did to Blac Chyna Could Be ‘Revenge Porn,’
Lawyers Say, and Illegal, WASH. POST (July 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/06/what-rob-kardashian-did-to-blac-chyna-could-be
-revenge-porn-lawyers-say-and-illegal/?utm_term=.111e5534700a [https://perma.cc/6TQX
-N8ZA].
5. Id.
6. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L.R. 345, 346 (2014).
7. See id. (describing that “images consensually given to an intimate partner who
later distributes them without consent” are “popularly referred to as ‘revenge porn’ ”).
8. Izadi, supra note 2.
9. Id.
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Nonconsensual pornography is not a new occurrence: just ask
actress Pamela Anderson.10 In 1996, Penthouse published intimate
images of newlyweds Tommy Lee and Pamela Anderson from a video
that had been stolen from their residence.11 Then in 1998, she and
ex-boyfriend Bret Michaels sued to prevent the dissemination of a
tape depicting the couple having intercourse.12 In perhaps the first
case of nonconsensual pornography, Playboy published nude photo-
graphs of Marilyn Monroe without her consent in its first issue in
1953.13 Kardashian’s own sister, Kim Kardashian, fell victim to non-
consensual pornography in 2014 when a hacker stole nude photos
of several celebrities and posted them online.14
The advent of the Internet has only served to amplify the amount
and exposure of nonconsensual pornography events.15 Websites dedi-
cated to hosting nonconsensual pornography have proven popular
amongst a certain audience, and one site, IsAnyoneUp?, peaked at
thirty million page views a month.16 One victim, Holli Thometz, found
that her intimate “images had gone viral,” appearing on more than
100,000 websites.17 According to a recent study, about two percent
of online Americans have had a nude or nearly nude photo of them-
selves posted online without their consent.18 For those between the
10. Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, No. CV96-7069SVW(JGx), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23893,
at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1997).
11. See id. (noting that the photos depicted “both of the Lees in various states of
undress” and “sexual touching between the Lees”).
12. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“On
or about October 31, 1994, Michaels and Lee recorded the [t]ape, which depicts them
having sex.”).
13. See Lily Rothman, How Playboy’s First Naked Centerfold Got Published, TIME
(Oct. 13, 2015), https://time.com/4071282/playboy-centerfold-1967-history [https://perma
.cc/P6MS-HHEW] (quoting a Time story from 1967 that said “Hefner may have run the
Marilyn Monroe shots without her consent, but now he has no problem finding big-name
actresses eager to appear in the magazine.”).
14. Maria Puente, Who’s Next? More Nude Celeb Pics Hacked, Leaked Online, USA
TODAY (Sept. 22, 2014, 5:11 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2014/09/22
/whos-next-more-nude-celeb-pics-hacked-leaked-online/16047773 [https://perma.cc/E5Y5
-HNB5].
15. See Jillian Roffer, Nonconsensual Pornography: An Old Crime Updates Its Soft-
ware, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 935, 937 (2017) (footnote omitted)
(“The Internet has changed the way society communicates and in turn, has created an
opportunity for a new category of crimes. Specifically, the Internet has exacerbated non-
consensual pornography as a form of gender abuse and an invasion of privacy.”).
16. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2014) (noting that
IsAnyoneUp? is now defunct).
17. See Samantha Kopf, Avenging Revenge Porn, 9 AM. U. MODERN AM. 22, 22 (2014)
(observing that sites hosting images of Thometz included “sextingpics.com, anonib.com,
pinkmeth.tv and xhamster.com”).
18. Amanda Lenhart et al., Nonconsensual Image Sharing: One in 25 Americans Has
Been a Victim of “Revenge Porn”, DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. (2016), https://datasociety.net
/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf.
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ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, that number rises to five percent,
or one in twenty young Americans.19
Victims of nonconsensual pornography can suffer devastating
mental health consequences.20 One study found that many victims
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression
and report trust issues, loss of control, and decreased self-esteem and
confidence.21 Some have even taken their own lives.22 “The victims
of these acts have lost jobs, been forced to change schools, change
their names, and have been subjected to real-life stalking and harass-
ment because of the actions of those who posted and distributed their
images,” Professor Mary Anne Franks writes, adding that “[t]he sex-
ually explicit images of them have been sent to their parents, their
children, their classmates, their employers; they have been used to
blackmail, stalk, and threaten their subjects.”23
As nonconsensual pornography has increased in popularity, vic-
tims have increasingly found difficulties in seeking civil remedies.24
Victims may not have the financial resources to bring suit, or would-
be defendants may be judgment proof.25 Revenge porn site operators
are largely immune from action due to Section 230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act.26 Furthermore, some victims fear creating a
Streisand effect27: drawing even more attention to an event they
want to end.28 Copyright law may seem like an attractive option, but
19. Id.
20. Samantha Bates, Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of the
Mental Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors, 12 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY
22, 30 (2017).
21. Id.
22. Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn Edition, CON-
CURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02
/adventures-in-victim-blaming-revenge-porn-edition.html [https://perma.cc/AF98-JVB9].
23. Id.
24. See infra Sections III.A–B and accompanying text.
25. See Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 358.
26. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
27. See Catherine Rampell, What Milo Yiannopoulos and Elizabeth Warren Have in
Common, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-milo-yian
nopoulos-and-elizabeth-warren-have-in-common/2017/02/09/ee5da942-ef0e-11e6-9662-6e
edf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.80c89565d047 [https://perma.cc/J8C6-7GFQ] (“The
term refers to what happens when an attempt to censor information backfires and instead
unintentionally draws more attention to the censorship target. Its namesake is Barbra
Streisand, who in 2003 sued a photographer for including a photograph of her Malibu home
among a series of 12,000 aerial images documenting California coastal erosion. . . . [T]his
previously little-seen photo soon received enormous publicity and hundreds of thousands
of views.”).
28. See Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 358.
2019] NO MEANS NO 307
if the victim did not take the photo, she or he likely does not possess
the bundle of rights granted to copyright holders.29
To help fill this gap, states have taken matters into their own
hands by criminalizing the distribution of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy.30 Prior to 2013, only New Jersey had a law on the books spe-
cifically targeting nonconsensual pornography,31 but by 2017, that
number had risen to thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.32
These laws have faced criticism,33 with some doubting whether they
could meet constitutional muster.34 With prohibitions against “images
that show sexual exposure or contact” and “dissemination without con-
sent of persons depicted,” Professor John Humbach argues that the
laws “fly directly in the face of the free speech and press guarantees of
the First Amendment.”35 Such clauses, Humbach contends, “constitute
unconstitutional content discrimination, viewpoint discrimination
and speaker discrimination, not to mention prior restraint.”36
However, legal experts have lauded many statutes as a step in
the right direction.37 The state laws vary widely in labeling the of-
fense, with some categorizing it as a misdemeanor, others a felony,
and still others codifying it as “a sexual offense or an invasion of
privacy.”38 This, along with the difficulties that arise from prosecut-
ing interstate crimes, has led experts to call for federal legislation.39
29. Id. at 359–60.
30. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
31. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech, 48 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 57, 94–95 (2014) (“Early in 2004, New Jersey enacted a statute making it a crime
to take or distribute photographs of someone else without her consent if the photographs
expose her ‘intimate parts’ or depict her being involved in sexual activity.”).
32. See Pam Greenberg, The Newest Net Threat, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 5
(May 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2017/SL_0517
-Trends.pdf.
33. See Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: Legislative Pushback
to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 688–93, 695–99 (2014) (describing both an early version of
California’s law and a proposed New York bill as well intended but flawed); Alex Jacobs,
Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn: A Legislative Solution, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
69, 80, 81 (2016) (noting that Virginia’s law requires “actual knowledge or malicious intent”
and that Arizona’s first attempt was constitutionally overbroad).
34. John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 217
(2014) (footnote omitted).
35. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
36. Id.
37. See Elaine Silvestrini, Legislators Intend to Outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’, TAMPA TRIB.
(Apr. 17, 2013, 2:32 PM), https://www.tbo.com/news/politics/legislators-intend-to-outlaw
-revenge-porn-b82475546z1 [https://perma.cc/42NQ-UEUJ] (quoting law professor Mary
Anne Franks as saying despite its flaws, she supported the passage of proposed Florida
legislation targeting nonconsensual pornography).
38. Roffer, supra note 15, at 938 (footnote omitted).
39. See Katlyn M. Brady, Revenge in Modern Times: The Necessity of a Federal Law
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 22 (2017) (“Congress should
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The question posed here is do current legal options provide ade-
quate remedies for victims who have previously released sexual im-
ages publicly? Blac Chyna formerly worked as a stripper,40 and she
has appeared nude on magazine covers.41 Put to the extreme, how
would an adult entertainment star’s potential remedies be affected
by her or his choice of career? Could such a hypothetical victim prove,
as required by Chyna and Kardashian’s home state of California,42
that the perpetrator knew or should have known “that distribution
of the image will cause serious emotional distress”?43 Assuming civil
claims are a viable option, a similar question would apply to the torts
of intentional infliction of emotional distress44 and intrusion upon
seclusion.45 Likewise, if a victim has previously released nude photos,
could nonconsensual pornography still qualify as a public disclosure
of private facts?46
This Article is divided into four remaining Parts. The first two
Parts address the aforementioned questions approximately tracking
Danielle Keats Citron’s and Mary Anne Franks’s seminal work in
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, with Part I focusing on criminal law and
Part II tackling civil remedies. Part III considers the application of
two legal principles—the incremental harm doctrine47 and rape shield
laws48—and their opposite would-be effects on the question at hand.
Finally, this Article concludes with a recommendation to incorporate
the principles of rape shield laws into nonconsensual pornography
jurisprudence.
I. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: THE IMPACT OF PREVIOUS PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION OF SEXUAL IMAGES
This Part has two Sections. The first analyzes how the prior con-
sensual release of sexual images could affect a victim’s case under
pass a law making revenge porn or cyber exploitation a federal crime and placing it within
the jurisdiction of assistant U.S. Attorneys.”).
40. See Izadi, supra note 2 (noting that Chyna is “a model, business executive and
former stripper”).
41. See Tirdad Derakhshani, Michael Strahan Isn’t the Only Change Coming to ‘Good
Morning America’, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 30, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.philly.com
/philly/columnists/sideshow/20160830_Michael_Strahan_isn_t_the_only_change_coming
_to__Good_Morning_America_.html [https://perma.cc/9YYT-J9FG] (observing that Chyna
posed “nude on the cover of Paper mag”).
42. See Mettler, supra note 4.
43. See infra note 59.
44. See infra Section II.A and accompanying text.
45. See infra Section II.B and accompanying text.
46. See infra Section II.C and accompanying text.
47. See infra Section III.A and accompanying text.
48. See infra Section III.B and accompanying text.
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California’s nonconsensual pornography statute. The second Section
explores the impact of the same scenario on various other criminal
statutes related to nonconsensual pornography.
A. California’s Nonconsensual Pornography Statute
Nearly a decade after New Jersey,49 California became the second
state to pass legislation specifically targeting nonconsensual pornog-
raphy in 2013.50 In addition to encompassing “the porn capital of the
world,”51 California is also the state Chyna and Kardashian call
home,52 providing a statute ripe for this analysis. Criminal defense
attorney Louis Shapiro points out that Kardashian’s actions are “in
many ways, exactly what revenge porn law talks about,” adding that
“[a] prosecutor here could choose to make an example of him even if
[Chyna] doesn’t want to cooperate.”53
Legal scholars criticized California’s initial attempt to outlaw
revenge porn as riddled with loopholes.54 Perhaps the most glaring
issue involved an exemption for images taken by the victim, com-
monly called “selfie[s].”55 This means that if an individual were to
send a sexually explicit photo to a partner and that partner later dis-
tributed that image, the act would fall outside the scope of the 2013
law.56 Likewise, if an individual had sexual images saved to a private
online cloud and a hacker stole and distributed the images, the hacker
could not be guilty under the original California legislation.57
California lawmakers remedied the issue by amending the law
in 2014.58 The current law provides, in relevant part, that:
49. See Larkin, supra note 31, at 94–95.
50. Michelle Daniels, Chapters 859 & 863: Model Revenge Porn Legislation or Merely
a Work in Progress?, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 297, 300 (2014).
51. See Tremor Slows ‘Porn Capital,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1994), https://www.nytimes
.com/1994/01/31/us/tremor-slows-porn-capital.html [https://perma.cc/2MDF-P6T9] (quoting
National Law Center for Children and Families lawyer Jan LaRue calling San Fernando
Valley “the porn capital of the world”).
52. Mettler, supra note 4.
53. Richard Winton, Kardashian Brother’s Posts Could Be Illegal: Explicit Images of
His Child’s Mother Online May Violate State Law on Revenge Porn, L.A. TIMES (July 6,
2017), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/los-angeles-times/20170706/281792809056337
[https://perma.cc/5GYS-JJLA].
54. See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
55. See Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different Paradigms
of the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 339 (2014) (footnote omitted) (noting that
the original law provided that “a user who posts a sexual ‘selfie,’ which he later regrets,
ha[d] no recourse for removing or forgetting the image”).
56. Eric Goldman, California’s New Law Shows it’s Not Easy to Regulate Revenge
Porn, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10
/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-not-easy-to-regulate-revenge-porn/#2807cc1627bb
[https://perma.cc/XCJ8-DW28].
57. Id.
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
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A[ny] person who intentionally distributes the image of the inti-
mate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image
of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse,
sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of mas-
turbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted
participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or
understand that the image shall remain private, the person dis-
tributing the image knows or should know that distribution of
the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person
depicted suffers that distress.59
The law also defines intentional distribution,60 intimate body part,61
and exemptions,62 as well as punishment.63
In particular, three segments of the law could negatively affect
the hypothetical victim described here, especially in light of a preju-
diced jury. In a classic study, Professors Harry Kalven and Hans
Zeisel found that jurors were more likely to acquit defendants whose
rape accusers participated in victim-precipitating actions not charac-
terized by a chaste woman.64 Further, Professor Michèle Alexandre
indicated that evidence of a victim’s sexual history “unfailingly per-
meates the jury’s decision as to whether or not the victim’s behavior
and past acts are worthy of protection” in rape trials.65
The first issue arises “under circumstances in which the persons
agree or understand that the image shall remain private.”66 This
portion bears similarities to the tort of public disclosure of private
facts, which receives more analysis in the next part of this Article.67
Obviously a defense could argue, barring a previous explicit agree-
ment that the images at question were to remain private, that an
59. Id.
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(B) (West 2017) (“A person intentionally dis-
tributes an image described in subparagraph (A) when he or she personally distributes
the image, or arranges, specifically requests, or intentionally causes another person to
distribute that image.”).
61. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(C) (West 2017) (“ ‘Intimate body part’ means any
portion of the genitals, the anus and in the case of a female, also includes any portion of
the breasts below the top of the areola, that is either uncovered or clearly visible through
clothing.”).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(D) (West 2017).
63. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2017) (mandating that those found guilty of
crimes in that section are “guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor”).
64. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249–54 (1966).
65. Michèle Alexandre, “Girls Gone Wild” and Rape Law: Revising the Contractual
Concept of Consent and Ensuring an Unbiased Application of “Reasonable Doubt” When
the Victim is Non-Traditional, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 41, 46 (2009) (foot-
note omitted).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
67. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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alleged victim’s previous consensual release of nude images created
doubt as to whether they would. That is to say, the term “under-
stand” creates ambiguity that might lead a prosecutor’s case afoul.
The next two portions, “the person distributing the image knows
or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious
emotional distress”68 and “the person depicted suffers that distress,”69
come from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which
this Article discusses more thoroughly in the next part.70 By provid-
ing that the defendant “knows . . . that distribution of the image will
cause serious emotional distress,” the legislation contains an element
of mens rea.71 However, the would-be perpetrator may argue that she
or he did not think the subject of the images would mind since similar
images were publicly available. As for the “should know”72 require-
ment of the law, an unsympathetic jury may concur that the defen-
dant could not have foreseen serious emotional distress due to the
victim’s prior actions.
The final portion of the law, “the person depicted suffers that
distress,”73 involves harm. Whether a prosecutor could prove this
element would rely largely on the jury and their perceptions of the
victim’s previous actions. Some jurors could assume that because the
individual already consented to having nude images out for public
display, the additional image or images could not have a serious emo-
tional impact. The answer to this issue could rest on unpredictable
human nature.
The aforementioned examples poke holes in the weakest ele-
ments of California’s nonconsensual pornography statute.74 If an
individual has previously consented to the public distribution of her
or his own nude images, the defense may have a case that the indi-
vidual lacks the capability to control future consent. Furthermore,
a case could rest upon a jury that has its own biases and prejudices.
All of this flies in the face of one adult entertainment star who noted
that all of the work she has produced was consensual, adding, “I am
only objectified when I want to be.”75
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
69. Id.
70. See discussion infra Section II.A.
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
75. Tish Weinstock, According to Feminist Porn Star Casey Calvert She’s Only Objecti-
fied when She Wants to Be, VICE (Feb. 5, 2015, 12:55 PM), https://i-d.vice.com/en_uk/arti
cle/evnva7/according-to-feminist-porn-star-casey-calvert-she39s-only-objectified-when
-she-wants-to-be-mx-translation [https://perma.cc/YT7M-SE4T].
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B. Sexual Harassment Law
Another potential criminal remedy for nonconsensual pornogra-
phy comes from sexual harassment law.76 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission defines sexual harassment as “[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature.”77 However, as professors Danielle
Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks point out, “nonconsensual por-
nography that is produced, distributed, or accessed by a victim’s
coworkers, employers, school officials, or fellow students raises the
possibility of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,” but claims arising outside of this narrow cate-
gory would fall flat.78 That is to say, the law only applies to a slim
class of offenders.79
Additionally, the term “unwelcome” could present challenges for
someone who has worked in the sex industry or otherwise released
her or his own nude images publicly. As one adult entertainment
actress put it, “[i]n an average work environment, it’s easier to
differentiate between acceptable behavior and harassment, but for
an adult performer on a porn set, this is murky territory.”80 Another
former actress faced an uphill battle when she tried to report sexual
harassment at the hospital where she worked.81 “In their eyes I was
already labeled a pervert because I was in the industry, not him,”
she said.82 Due to the limited applicability of sexual harassment laws
and the vagueness of the term “unwelcome” coupled with the stigma
surrounding adult entertainment workers, victims could have a hard
time pursuing this path.
This section provides evidence that neither California’s noncon-
sensual pornography statute nor sexual harassment laws provide
much coverage for victims of nonconsensual pornography who have
previously released nude images of themselves. Largely, issues arise
76. See generally Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-sex.html [https://perma.cc/T684-PUD7] (discus-
sing sexual harassment as a type of sex discrimination).
77. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 360 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 360–61 (footnotes omitted).
79. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a), (c) (West 1972); 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-1(a)–(c), 2000e
-2(a)–(n) (West 1964).
80. Aurora Snow, Porn Stars Can Be Sexually Assaulted Too: Why Adult Actresses
Have a Hard Time Reporting, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 25, 2015, 3:17 AM), https://www.the
dailybeast.com/porn-stars-can-be-sexually-assaulted-too-why-adult-actresses-have-a
-hard-time-reporting [https://perma.cc/L9VU-SG6Z].
81. See id.
82. Id.
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from victims’ histories and their impact on the elements required to
prove these crimes.83 A similar pattern emerges in the next part,
which analyzes the impact of the potential victims’ previous actions
on various tort remedies.
II. CIVIL PROVISIONS: THE IMPACT OF PREVIOUS PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION OF SEXUAL IMAGES
This Part contains four Sections dedicated to exploring the im-
pact of a nonconsensual pornography victim’s previous consensual
release of sexually explicit images on potential tort remedies. The first
Section considers the effect on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort, and the following two Sections focus on the privacy torts
of intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.
Finally, the fourth Section addresses copyright claims.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress gained
much of its traction as a legal concept after Dean William L. Prosser
published an article on the subject in 1939.84 Dean Prosser pressed
for courts to accept the tort and “jettison the entire cargo of techni-
cal torts with which the real cause of action has been burdened.”85
The tort’s eventual inclusion in the Restatement of Torts led to gen-
eral acceptance in American jurisprudence, and “the elements of the
tort as described in the Restatement being widely accepted and
quoted.”86 Those elements provide that the tort occurs when “[o]ne
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from
it, for such bodily harm.”87
Although intentional infliction of emotional distress subsists un-
der extensive common law, many states have codified the tort, set-
ting a high bar for a successful claim.88 To establish the claim in
83. See id.
84. See Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1996) (citing Prosser’s arti-
cle as a “landmark law review article” that capsulized “[t]he essence of the tort”).
85. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874, 892 (1939).
86. Kroger, 920 S.W.2d at 65 (citation omitted).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
88. See Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in
the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 112 (2003) (“[M]ost
states set a very high legal and factual standard for the common law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”).
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California, one must prove that the defendant’s “conduct was outra-
geous” and either “intended to cause” or performed “with reckless dis-
regard of the probability that” the plaintiff “would suffer emotional
distress.”89 Furthermore, the plaintiff must have actually “suffered
severe emotional distress,” and the defendant’s conduct must have
been “a substantial factor in causing [the] severe emotional distress.”90
This analysis bears similarity to that of the California criminal
statute91 due to the law’s inclusion of several elements from inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. As with the criminal law, “the
jury determines whether the conduct has been extreme and outra-
geous” for a successful intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.92 Accordingly, the issue persists that jury members could hold
negative biases of those who have previously released nude images
to the public.
Proving severe emotional distress rests on whether the anguish
subsisted “of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no
reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure
it.”93 Moreover, the defendant’s conduct must rise to the level of “so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civi-
lized community.”94 While these definitions may work in most cases,95
the question at hand could leave jurors to consider whether the de-
fendant’s actions actually constitute outrageous behavior and whether
the plaintiff truly suffered severe emotional distress.
Additionally, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell added a layer of con-
stitutional protection to the tort.96 Here, the Supreme Court opined
that public figures—such as Chyna and potentially others who pro-
duce sexual content—cannot:
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing in addition that the publication contains a false state-
ment of fact which was made with “actual malice,” i.e., with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disre-
gard as to whether or not it was true.97
89. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1600 (2017), https://www.justia.com
/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1600/1600 [https://perma.cc/FR6K-TADM] [hereinafter JUD.
COUNCIL CAL. CIV. JURY].
90. Id.
91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
92. Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 605 (2012).
93. Fletcher v. Western Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (1970).
94. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 901 (1982).
95. See id.; Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
96. See generally 485 U.S. 46, 50–51, 56–57 (1988) (discussing constitutional limits
concerning the intentional infliction of emotional distress).
97. Id. at 56 (emphasis omitted).
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In the event of nonconsensual pornography of a public figure, a claim
surely could not survive. No reasonable person would agree that
nude images constitute falsity. Perhaps with additional text or un-
der certain circumstances falsity could exist, but not with the images
on their face.
Accordingly, it would prove exceedingly difficult for an individual
who has previously disseminated nude images publicly to recover for
nonconsensual pornography under intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Similar to issues with the California criminal statute,98 the
victim’s previous behavior could lead to jury bias against her or him.
Moreover, the victim’s actions could help to classify them as a public
figure, making it nearly impossible to succeed in an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim.99
B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
In their 1890 landmark law review article, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis articulated a distinct need for a recognized privacy
right.100 Prior to this seminal work, the pair pointed out, “[h]owever
painful the mental effects upon another of an act, though purely
wanton or even malicious, yet if the act itself is otherwise lawful,
the suffering inflicted is damnum absque injuria.”101 Put simply, no
legal remedy existed for invasions of privacy, no matter how extreme
the emotional damage.102
By 1939, the First Restatement of Torts recognized invasion of
privacy as “[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with
another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”103 The Second
Restatement laid out four distinct privacy torts: (1) unreasonable in-
trusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of the other’s
name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s
private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in
a false light before the public.104 This section considers the result of
a nonconsensual pornography victim’s previous dissemination of nude
photos on her or his chances at recovery under the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion; the next section considers the same scenario’s effect
under a claim of public disclosure of private facts.105
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2017).
99. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56–57.
100. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195–96 (1890).
101. Id. at 197.
102. See id.
103. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
105. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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Presently, most jurisdictions in the United States recognize in-
vasion of privacy torts.106 To establish a successful claim in California,
a plaintiff must prove that she or he “had a reasonable expectation
of privacy” and that the defendant “intentionally intruded in” a cir-
cumstance that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”107
Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that she or he suffered harm
and that the defendant’s conduct constituted “a substantial factor
in causing [his or her] harm.”108
The first issue an individual who has previously released nude
images may face comes from the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
clause. California provides three factors in determining whether a
plaintiff held a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) the defendant’s
identity; (2) “[t]he extent to which other persons had access to” the
material; and (3) “[t]he means by which the intrusion occurred.”109
In particular, the second factor could provide trouble due to similar
images already existing and available to the public.
Likewise, three factors exist for deciding whether a reasonable
person would find the intrusion highly offensive: (1) “[t]he extent of
the intrusion”; (2) the “[defendant’s] motives and goals”; and (3) “[t]he
setting in which the intrusion occurred.”110 The first factor111 pro-
vides uncertainty in the scenario at question. A defense could likely
argue that the previous images of the plaintiff minimize the effects
of the intrusion, and as noted before, a jury may hold bias against
an individual who has posed nude for the public eye.
C. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
In Warren and Brandeis’s influential article on privacy, they
condemned the press for overstepping their bounds.112 “Gossip is no
longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,” they found, “but
has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effron-
tery.”113 In perhaps the vilest affront, the pair observed that “the
106. See James W. Hilliard, A Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The Un-
reasonable Intrusion on Another’s Seclusion, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 602, 604 (1999) (ob-
serving that then, nearly two decades ago, “only a handful of states fail[ed] to recognize
a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy.”).
107. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CIV. JURY, supra note 89, at § 1800.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 100, at 196 (“The press is overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”).
113. Id.
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details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers.”114 This type of invasion now falls under the tort of
public disclosure of private facts.115
For a successful public disclosure of private facts claim in
California, a plaintiff must prove several elements.116 Many of the ele-
ments exist in the intrusion upon seclusion claim,117 and as such
they do not need belaboring here. However, the most important dis-
tinction lies within the first element—“[t]hat [the defendant] publi-
cized private information concerning [the plaintiff].”118 As you might
imagine, this essential element could leave an individual who has
previously and publicly disseminated nude images without recourse.
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune provides an example of how an exist-
ing public fact can derail a public disclosure of private facts case.119
Diaz underwent gender corrective surgery, and she “scrupulously”
kept this a secret from all but her closest friends and family.120 How-
ever, the Oakland Tribune outed her as transsexual in a column
following a controversy that arose during her stint as student body
president of a community college.121 The staff published the article
after verifying the fact through police records,122 and the court held
that “[g]enerally speaking, matter which is already in the public do-
main is not private, and its publication is protected.”123
If someone cannot prevail in a public disclosure of private facts
case even when they strive to keep certain details of her or his life
secret, the hypothetical nonconsensual pornography victim discussed
here may have little or no hope.124 If nude images have already en-
tered the public domain, they fail to qualify as private, and therefore,
the would-be plaintiff could not successfully prove the necessary
elements to bring about this claim.125
114. See id.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
116. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CIV. JURY, supra note 89, at § 1801 (listing an additional ele-
ment of “[t]hat the private information was not of legitimate public concern [or did not
have a substantial connection to a matter of legitimate public concern],” which is not
relevant to the current discussion).
117. See discussion supra Section II.B.
118. See JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CIV. JURY, supra note 89, at § 1801.
119. See 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765–68, 771 (1983).
120. Id. at 765.
121. See id. at 765–66 (detailing that the newspaper column read: “The students at the
College of Alameda will be surprised to learn their student body president, Toni Diaz,
is no lady, but is in fact a man whose real name is Antonio.”).
122. Id. at 766.
123. Id. at 771.
124. See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
125. See id.
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D. Copyright
Some nonconsensual pornography victims have found success
in copyright claims.126 Only a copyright owner has the authority to
authorize the reproduction of their works.127 Despite the fact that
many images at issue in nonconsensual pornography cases are not
previously published—or ever intended to be—by the owner, the Copy-
right Act protects unpublished works as well.128 The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act’s notice and takedown procedure provides that
victims simply need to submit a signed statement identifying the un-
authorized images and where they are located.129 As long as the ser-
vice provider removes the images, the provider escapes liability.130
This solution is not wholly without issue. While victims them-
selves take more than eighty percent of images in this genre,131 if a
victim did not take the image, à la selfie, she or he likely does not own
the copyright.132 Some scholars have also pointed out that issuing a
notice and takedown request does not stop the “whack-a-mole” ef-
fect133: once an image appears on the Internet, it may travel from
site to site, leading the victim down an endless wormhole.134 Such sites
include those outside of the jurisdiction of the U.S. government.135
Additionally, some websites are reluctant to comply with requests
at all, banking on the fact that a victim lacks the resources to hire
a lawyer and sue.136
To the effect that copyright claims can help some nonconsensual
pornography victims, it could also likely help those who have previ-
ously published nude images. The law makes no room for bias or
ambiguity concerning the victim or her or his past.137 Assuming the
victim meets the qualifications of any other individual seeking to
126. See Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
364, 370 (2016) (footnote omitted) (“Various plaintiffs who have been victims of NCP have
adopted as a litigation strategy the notice and takedown approach Bartow suggests.”).
127. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West 2002).
128. 17 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (West 2002) (“The works specified by sections 102 and 103,
while unpublished, are subject to protection under this title without regard to the nation-
ality or domicile of the author.”).
129. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3) (West 2010).
130. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(1) (West 2010).
131. See Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: Copyright
Law?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/our
-best-weapon-against-revenge-porn-copyright-law/283564 [https://perma.cc/YH8B-9RN5].
132. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 360.
133. Levendowski, supra note 131.
134. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 360.
135. Chon, supra note 126, at 371.
136. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 360.
137. See generally supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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use the notice and takedown procedure, this remedy may prove the
best route of any suggested in this Article.
III. INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE VERSUS RAPE SHIELD LAWS—
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This Article now turns to examine two legal concepts from fields
related to nonconsensual pornography. The first Section outlines the
incremental harm doctrine associated with defamation law. Next,
the underpinnings of rape shield laws are explored. Along with over-
views, this Section provides consideration of how the application of
these external theories could impact the hypothetical nonconsensual
pornography victim described earlier in this Article.138
A. Incremental Harm Doctrine
The Restatement of Torts defined defamation as communication
that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.”139 To successfully claim defama-
tion, one must prove four elements, including “a false and defama-
tory statement concerning another.”140 The Second Restatement goes
on to say that “truth is an affirmative defense which must be raised
by the defendant.”141 Parsed more simply, without falsity, there can
exist no liability for defamation.142
However, even partial falsity can nullify a defamation cause of
action.143 For instance, substantial truth has proven an adequate
defense in some cases.144 In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,145 Judge
Antonin Scalia—then sitting on the D.C. Circuit—illustrated this
point with a hypothetical: “If, for example, an individual is said to
have been convicted of 35 burglaries, when the correct number is 34,
138. See generally infra Sections III.A–B.
139. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
141. Id. § 581A cmt. b.
142. Id. § 581A.
143. See Nat Stern, Creating a New Tort for Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character,
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 81, 132 (2004) (footnote omitted) (finding that “[i]n some libel suits,
the defendant concedes that his communication contains elements of falsity but contends
that these are cleansed by an underlying truth” and that “[t]hree distinct doctrines have
been developed as articulations of this defense: the substantial truth doctrine, the incre-
mental harm doctrine, and the Court’s standard for judging altered quotations set forth
in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.”).
144. See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
145. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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it is not likely that the statement is actionable.”146 As Judge Scalia
went on to rationalize, “since the essentially derogatory implication
of the statement (‘he is an habitual burglar’) is correct, he has not
been libeled.”147
Bearing similarity to the substantial truth defense, the incre-
mental harm doctrine provides an additional caveat to proving a
communication’s truth.148 Professor Joseph King explains that “the
incremental harm doctrine provides that if the potentially action-
able parts of a publication do not add significantly to the adverse
reputational impact beyond that attributable to the nonactionable
portions of the same publication, then the defamation claim should,
to that extent, be dismissed or at least ultimately denied.”149 As
attorney Erin Daly succinctly put it, “[t]he incremental harm doc-
trine merely precludes liability where there is no actual injury to a
plaintiff’s reputation.”150
Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc.151 laid the groundwork for the doctrine in 1981.152 Consumers
Union of the United States published an article with a laundry list
of criticisms against Simmons Ford’s CitiCar.153 At issue, one claim
stated, was that a certain safety standard existed for other vehicles
but that electric cars such as CitiCar received exemptions making
them unsafe.154 While the safety of the car escaped dispute, Simmons
Ford claimed that such a standard did not exist and therefore their
car could not receive exemption.155 The court granted summary
judgment to Consumers Union of the United States because “the
portion of the article challenged by plaintiffs, could not harm their
146. Id. at 1563 n.6.
147. Id.
148. See Stern, supra note 143, at 135 (“The incremental harm doctrine is closely re-
lated to the question of substantial truth.”).
149. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Misbegotten Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine and the “Gordian
Knot” Syndrome, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 343, 351–52 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
150. Erin Daly, The Incremental Harm Doctrine: Is There Life After Masson?, 46 ARK.
L. REV. 371, 375 (1993).
151. 516 F. Supp. 742 (1981).
152. See Stern, supra note 143, at 135 (“The doctrine had its origin and prototypical
application in Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.”).
153. See Simmons Ford, 516 F. Supp. at 744 (The article discussed, “at length a variety
of safety problems plaguing the CitiCar and Elcar, notably their flimsy construction and
low maximum speed, both of which rendered the cars, in the opinion of the article’s writers,
unsafe for use on public highways also traveled by faster and heavier automobiles.”).
154. See id. at 744 (noting that Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. published
an article stating “[c]onventional passenger cars must conform to certain Federal safety
standards. But to spur the development of low-emission vehicles, the Government has
granted temporary exemptions from some of those standards to manufacturers of electric
cars—with unfortunate results.”).
155. See id.
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reputations in any way beyond the harm already caused by the re-
mainder of the article.”156
However, some have suggested its health is waning.157 A decade
after the doctrine’s inception, the Supreme Court dealt a blow to it
in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.158 In delivering the opinion of
the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that they “reject any sug-
gestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a matter
of First Amendment protection for speech.”159 Instead, he added,
states may individually choose if they will adopt it.160 Following this
decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the doctrine’s applicability in
California law, and other jurisdictions have rejected or come close
to rejecting it.161
Under current law, something akin to the incremental harm
doctrine already provides the lens through which nonconsensual
pornography victims are judged. Without safeguards, their previous
disclosures of nude images exist freely for the record. It takes no real
leap of the imagination for one to envision that a jury might find that
the victim suffered no real damage beyond what they themselves
had already published for the public eye.
B. Rape Shield Laws
The United States carries with it a troublesome history of gender
bias in rape jurisprudence.162 In particular, women who lack sexual
purity also lack credibility in making rape claims.163 As Professor
Aviva Orenstein described, “the law treated a woman claiming to be
a rape victim with great suspicion, subjecting her to intense cross-
examination regarding her dress, sexual history, and proclivities. Any
156. See id. at 750.
157. See Daly, supra note 150, at 372 (“The doctrine is currently not in good health,
and some might even say that it is beyond hope.”).
158. See 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
159. Id. at 523.
160. See id. (opining that the matter is “a question of state law” and that “we are given
no indication that California accepts this doctrine, though it remains free to do so”).
161. See Daly, supra note 150, at 372 (footnote omitted) (writing that before Masson,
“[t]he District of Columbia Circuit had already rejected it, and the Second Circuit (credited
with having spawned the doctrine) had come close to repudiating it.”).
162. See Alexandre, supra note 65, at 45–46 (footnotes omitted) (“Until the complete
eradication of gender bias from rape laws is made an expressed goal by the legislature
and judicial bodies, women, particularly non-traditional women, will continue to suffer
from implied and express gender biases in the implementation of rape laws.”).
163. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 53 (2002) (footnote omit-
ted) (finding that “an unchaste woman was considered more likely to have succumbed
willingly to the defendant’s sexual advances and to have lied about it later”).
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prior sexual activity on her part outside of marriage undermined the
veracity of the victim’s claim.”164 Coupled with the rape, this dual
victimization provided an avenue for further attack on her values,
character, and dignity.165 The humiliation and harassment women
faced during trial led to rape becoming “the least reported crime.”166
In response, jurisdictions across the United States began to pass
rape shield laws in the 1970s.167 By the next decade, every state and
the federal government had adopted some version of this legisla-
tion.168 Rape shield laws, to varying degrees, prohibit the introduc-
tion of a victim’s previous sexual history as evidence in rape trials.169
In essence, these statutes serve to combat the so-called “chastity
requirement” formerly inherent in rape law.170
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412 forbids “(1) evidence offered
to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evi-
dence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition” from admis-
sion in proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct.171 In criminal
cases, exemptions exist for:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if
offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence
of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to
the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the
defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s con-
stitutional rights.172
164. Aviva Orenstein, The Seductive Power of Patriarchal Stories, 58 HOW. L.J. 411,
413 (2015) (footnote omitted).
165. See id. at 413–14.
166. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts:
A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986) (footnote omitted)
(additionally quoting then Representative Elizabeth Holtzman as saying that “[i]t is
estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is ever reported.”).
167. Id. at 765.
168. See Tasha Hill, Sexual Abuse in California Prisons: How the California Rape
Shield Fails the Most Vulnerable Populations, 21 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 90 (2014) (“In
the 1970s and 1980s, recognizing the importance of protecting complaining witnesses,
all fifty states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia passed varying
versions of rape shield laws.”).
169. See Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245, 1246 (1989) (“[Rape shield] laws are designed, through a variety
of means, to restrict the historically unlimited inquiry into a woman’s sexual past in
order to negate the claim of nonconsensual sex.”).
170. See Anderson, supra note 163, at 54 (“Rape shield laws emerged on the legal
landscape to curtail the excesses of the chastity requirement.”).
171. FED. R. EVID. 412.
172. Id. R. 412(b)(1).
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And in a civil case, Rule 412 requires the judge to weigh whether
the evidence’s “probative value substantially outweighs the danger
of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”173
While the laws could face constitutional challenges, these chal-
lenges seem unlikely to succeed.174 The Sixth Amendment right to
present a complete defense—as the Supreme Court pointed out in
Michigan v. Lucas175—stops short of absolute.176 In upholding Michi-
gan’s statute, the Court found that rape shield laws “represent[ ] a
valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions
of privacy.”177
Due to its similarities to rape, some refer to nonconsensual por-
nography as “cyber rape.”178 Like rape, the act serves as a way to
exert sexual dominance over victims179 and to deny victims control
of their own bodies.180 A recent study showed that nonconsensual
pornography victims even share symptoms of rape trauma syndrome
such as “high levels of stress, alcohol use, PTSD, clinical depression,
and [blaming] themselves for the assault.”181 The study also found
that victims of both forms of violence share common coping mecha-
nisms including avoidance, denial, and self-medication.182
The fundamental difference between rape and nonconsensual
pornography rests with physical contact.183 However, as Justice Horace
Gray opined in 1891,
[t]he inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compul-
sory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the
touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an
assault, and a trespass.184
Furthermore, Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne
Franks keenly note that voyeurism laws already acknowledge that
harm and suffering can result without physical contact.185
173. Id. R. 412(b)(2).
174. Hill, supra note 168, at 128.
175. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
176. See id. at 149.
177. Id. at 150.
178. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 346 n.10.
179. See Bates, supra note 20, at 25.
180. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 353.
181. Bates, supra note 20, at 33.
182. Id. at 39.
183. See Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 362.
184. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
185. Citron & Franks, supra note 6, at 363.
324 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 25:303
With these things in mind, one could logically deduce how victims
of rape and nonconsensual pornography should share one more no-
tion: shield laws. In promoting the willingness of victims to come
forward and protecting them from jury bias, the protections would
operate comparably to existing laws. By providing an escape from
the “chastity requirement”186 in today’s laws related to nonconsen-
sual pornography, victims could successfully find remedies regardless
of their previous sexual history—including their consensual publish-
ing of nude images.
CONCLUSION
In commenting on the Blac Chyna/Rob Kardashian incident,
California trial attorney Mitch Jackson said that “[w]hen it comes
to social media, the law (in general) is 10 years behind the times.”187
This Article illustrates Jackson’s point. Under California criminal law,
a perpetrator who publishes nonconsensual pornography of someone
who has previously released nude images may elude prosecution.188
Likewise, the victim stands little chance of recovering through tortious
remedies such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, intru-
sion upon seclusion, and public disclosure of private facts.189
Because the victim already has sexual images on display, it can
prove difficult to demonstrate such factors as whether she or he
actually suffered serious emotional distress,190 whether the perpetra-
tor’s conduct was outrageous,191 or even whether the victim had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.192 Under current criminal and
civil law, something akin to the incremental harm doctrine comes into
play for the hypothetical victims discussed here.193 In other words,
a jury may determine a victim only suffered minimal damage com-
pared to what images already exist for the public eye.194 At which
point, the jury could foreseeably determine that one or more of the
aforementioned elements were not met.195
186. See Anderson, supra note 163, at 53.
187. Maria Puente, Rob Kardashian’s X-Rated Rant Against Blac Chyna Could Be a
Crime, USA TODAY (July 5, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people
/2017/07/05/rob-kardashians-x-rated-online-rant-against-blac-chyna-could-be-crime/1
03453660 [https://perma.cc/N3EG-ZRJZ].
188. See discussion supra Part I.
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However, rape shield laws provide a possible path forward.196
These laws already exist to keep a victim’s previous sexual history
out of the courtroom in cases involving sexual misconduct,197 so their
application to nonconsensual pornography episodes seems obvious.
Given the similarities between victims of rape and nonconsensual
pornography,198 it logically follows that these shield laws would also
protect nonconsensual pornography victims from “the invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the
infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process.”199 As Chyna’s
attorney Lisa Bloom stated, “any explicit photos that she may have
chosen to post in the past, that’s her choice.”200
Chyna’s attorney laid out the principles of exactly what this Ar-
ticle argues.201 “We have the right to say no to the release of explicit
images,” Bloom said, adding that “[i]t doesn’t matter what images
may already be out there.”202 This author thinks she hit the nail on
the head. In the words of our unanticipated hero, “I am Angela White,
I’m Blac Chyna. I can do whatever I want. It’s my body.”203
196. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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